
Consultation
Paper*
ALL INDIA JUDICIAL SERVICE
* The
views expressed and the suggestions contained in this paper are intended
for the sole purpose of generating public debate and eliciting public
response.
VIGYAN BHAVAN ANNEXE, NEW DELHI – 110 011
E-mail: <ncrwc@nic.in> Fax No. 011-3022082
on Justice
Shri B.P. Jeevan Reddy Justice
Shri H.R. Khanna q Shri
K. Parasaran q Dr.
Jayaprakash Narayan q Dr. V.
A. Pai Panandikar Dr.
Raghbir Singh
Advisory Panel
Strengthening of the institutions of Parliamentary Democracy;
(Working of the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary;
their accountability; problems of Administrative,
Social and Economic Cost of Political
Instability; Exploring the possibilities
of stability within the discipline
of Parliamentary Democracy)
Member-in-charge
Chairperson
Members
Member-Secretary
This
Consultation Paper on ‘All India Judicial Service’ is based on a paper prepared
by Justice Shri B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Member of the Commission.
The Commission places on record its profound appreciation of
and gratitude to Justice Shri B.P. Jeevan Reddy for his contribution.
CONTENTS
|
|
|
Pages |
|
I. |
Basic Constitutional Provisions relating to Subordinate
Judiciary |
751 |
|
II. |
All – India Judicial Service |
751 |
|
III. |
Suggestions of the 1st Law Commission |
753 |
|
IV. |
Later Recommendations of the Law Commission |
753 |
|
V. |
Recommendations of the National Judicial Pay Commission |
754 |
|
VI. |
Some relevant considerations |
756 |
|
|
Questionnaire |
758 |
I. Basic Constitutional Provisions relating to Subordinate Judiciary
Chapter VI
of Part VI of the Constitution of
India deals with subordinate courts.
Clause (1) of Article 233 says that “appointments of persons to be, and
the posting and promotion of, district judges in any State shall be made by the
Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to such State.”
Clause (2) is not relevant for the purpose. Article 233A is also not relevant since it deals with validation
of appointments of, and judgments, etc. delivered by certain district judges
whose appointment was declared to be illegal by the Supreme Court. Article 234 says that appointments of
persons other than district judges to the judicial service of a State shall be
made by the Governor of the State in accordance with the rules made by him in
that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and
with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. Article 235 vests control over the
subordinate courts in the High Court.
It reads “The control over district courts and courts subordinate
thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to,
persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any posts
inferior to the post of district judges shall be vested in the High Court, but
nothing in this article shall be construed as taking away from any such person
any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions
of his service or as authorizing the High Court to deal with him otherwise than
in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such
law”. Article 236 is an interpretation
clause. It defines the expressions
“district judge” and “judicial service” respectively. It is sufficient to notice the definition of “district
judge”. It includes “judge of a city
civil court, additional district judge, joint district judge, assistant
district judge, chief judge of a small cause court, chief presidency
magistrate, additional chief presidency magistrate, sessions judge, additional
sessions judge and assistant sessions judge”.
It is not necessary to notice article 237 for the present purpose.
II. All – India Judicial Service
2. Article
309 of the Constitution which occurs in chapter 1 of Part XIV deals with the
recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a
State. It empowers the appropriate
Legislature to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed
to public services and post in connection with the affairs of the Union or of
any State. The proviso however says
that until the appropriate Legislature shall make the rules, it shall be open
to the President, in the case of services under the Union, and to the Governor,
in respect of the services under the State, to make rules for the said
purpose. Article 310, which
incorporates pleasure clauses, is not relevant for the present purpose. Article 311 contains three clauses. Clause (1) says that no member of a civil
service, whether of the Union or the State, shall be dismissed or removed by an
authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Clauses (2) and (3) go together. Clause (2) provides for a disciplinary
inquiry to be held against a member of civil service before a punishment is
imposed upon him. The proviso to Clause
(2) creates three exceptions to the above rule which again is not necessary to
notice for the present purpose. Clause
(3) which qualifies the second proviso
can equally be omitted from consideration.
Article 312 deals with the All-India services. Prior to the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, it
did not specifically refer to an All-India Judicial Service. It was however brought in along with Clauses
(3) and (4) by the Constitution Amendment Act.
As it stands today, Article 312 reads as thus:
“312. All-India services- (1) Notwithstanding
anything in [Chapter VI of Part VI or Part XI], if the Council of States has
declared by resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of the members
present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest
so to do, Parliament may by law provide for the creation of one or more
all-India services [(including an all-India judicial service)] common to the
Union and the States, and, subject to the other provisions of this Chapter,
regulate the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed,
to any such service.
(2) The services known at the
commencement of this Constitution as the Indian Administrative Service and the
Indian Police Service shall be deemed to be services created by Parliament
under this article.
(3) The all-India judicial
service referred to in clause (1) shall not include any post inferior to that
of a district judge as defined in article 236.
(4)
The Law providing for the creation of the all-India judicial
service aforesaid may contain such provisions for the amendment of Chapter VI
of Part VI as may be necessary for giving effect to the provisions of that law
and no such law shall be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution for the
purposes of Article 368.”
3. A
reading of the afore-mentioned provision of the Constitution yields the
following features:-
(i) The subordinate courts/subordinate judiciary
is a State subject. The appointment of
the members of the subordinate judiciary is to be made by the Governor. However such appointment is to be made in
the case of district judge, in consultation with the High Court and in the case
of other posts, in consultation with the Public Service Commission and the High
Court. As matter of practice, selection
of district judges is made by the High Court on the basis of which, formal
order of appointment is issued by the Governor. In case of Munsiff/ Magistrates, the selection is made by the
State Public Service Commission and the concerned High Court acting together
and orders of appointment are issued by the Governor on the basis of such
selection.
(ii) Though
Clause (1) of Article 233 does not expressly say that the appointment of
district judges can be regulated by the rules made under the proviso to Article
309, a conjoint reading of both the provisions would show that rules can be
made under the proviso to Article 309 with respect to method of appointment of
district judges also subject of course to the provisions to the
Constitution including Articles 233 and 160.
As a matter of fact, such rules have been made in several States.
(iii) The
control over the subordinate courts is vested in the High Court. The expression “control” has been construed
in a highly expansive manner by the Supreme Court to take in posting, transfer,
disciplinary matters and all other conditions of service.
(iv) If the
Council of States (Rajya Sabha) declares by resolution supported by not less than
two-third of members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in
the national interest to do so, Parliament may by law provide for creation of
an All-India Judicial Service (AIJS) common to the Union and the States and
also to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed
to such All-India service. This proviso
is made notwithstanding the provisions contained in chapter VI of Part VI of
the Constitution. However, the
All-India judicial service cannot include any post inferior to that of district
judge (as defined in Article 236). The
law made by Parliament providing for creation of AIJS as contemplated by Clause
(1) of Article 312 may contain such provisions for the amendment of chapter VI
of Part VI, as may be necessary to
give effect to the provisions of that clause but no such law shall be deemed to
be an amendment of the Constitution within the meaning of Article 368.
4. So far no such All-India Judicial
Service has been constituted though this matter has been receiving the
attention of several concerned bodies and organizations for the last few
decades. It would be appropriate to
refer to the several suggestions made in this behalf.
III. Suggestions of the 1st Law
Commission
5. The
first Law Commission recommended in its fourteenth report (volume 1, Chapter
IX, Para 59, page 184) the creation of an AIJS. It opined that such a course is necessary in the interest of
efficiency of the subordinate judiciary.
This proposal was considered in the Law Ministers’ Conference held in
the year 1960 where strong opinions were expressed for and against the said
proposal. The proposal was accordingly
shelved. It appears that the Chief Justices
Conferences held in 1961, 1963 and 1965 favoured the said recommendation but
when the views of the State Governments and the High Courts were sought, there
was a difference of opinion. More than
half of the States and High Courts opposed to the proposal.
IV. Later Recommendations of the Law Commission
6. In
August 1969, the Government requested the then Chief Justice of India to offer
his views on the said proposal. The learned Chief Justice opined that the
proposal was not feasible in the face of the then obtaining provisions of the
Constitution. In March 1972, however,
the learned Chief Justice while suggesting to the Government to improve the
conditions of service of subordinate judiciary, also suggested examination of
the question of having an AIJS.
7. The
8th Law Commission while examining the problem of arrears in trial
courts, recommended formation of an AIJS.
(77th Report Chapter IX Para 9.6, page 32)
8. Even
after the amendment of Article 312 by the forty-second amendment, expressly
providing for the formation of an AIJS, the opposition to this idea from
several High Courts and State Governments has not abated.
9. This
matter was again considered by the Law Commission in its 116th
report (submitted in November, 1986).
The report dealt with three objections, generally put forward against
said proposal, namely :-
(a)
inadequate knowledge of regional language would corrode
judicial efficiency both with regard to understanding and appreciating parole
evidence pronouncing judgments;
(b)
promotional avenues of the members of the State judiciary
would be severely curtailed causing heart burning to those who have already
entered the service and manning of the State judicial service would be
adversely effected; and
(c)
erosion of control of the High Court over subordinate
judiciary would impair independence of the judiciary.
10. The Law Commission considered each of the above objections at
length and rejected them as unsubstantial.
It held that a member of the All-India Judicial Service would be
required to learn one more language over and above his mother tongue and once
he is allotted to a State keeping in view the said fact, no problems would
arise on the ground of language.
Reference was made to members of Indian Administrative Service in this
behalf. It also referred to the fact
that prior to the independence there were provinces like Bombay and Madras, which comprised more than one linguistic
area. For example, the Bombay province
comprised Gujarati speaking, Marathi speaking and Kannada speaking areas and
Madras province included Tamil speaking,
Telugu speaking and Malayalam
speaking areas. If no difficulty was
found in those provinces at that time,
the Commission observed, there is no reason to feel that the language question
should pose a problem. With respect to
the second objection, the Commission observed that in as much as according to
the present rules in force in various States about 50% (if not, more)
vacancies in the cadre of District Judges are reserved to be filled by promotion
from the lower cadres and because the members of AIJS will be allocated only against
the vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment, the promotional prospects of
judicial officers (below district judge level)
will in no way be affected.
Similarly, it was held with
respect to the third objection, that
the control of the High Court will in no manner be diminished or curtailed
because on allotment to a State, the allottees (members of AIJS) would become
members of the State Judicial Service for all practical purposes with the
difference that “while at present it (High Court) recommends various things
such as promotion or disciplinary action to the Governor, it would be
recommending the same to the National Judicial Service Commission which, in
turn, would make necessary
recommendation to the President of India
but the President of India will act in the same manner as at present it
is done by the Governor having regard to the almost binding character of the
recommendation of the High Court.”
Besides rejecting the third criticism, the Law Commission also
emphasized the desirability of such an All-India Judicial Service in the
interest of efficiency. It made
elaborate recommendations with respect to the method of recruitment, holding of
examinations, scales of pay, initial pay, seniority, probation, training and so
on. (It also recommended by a separate
report creation of a National Judicial Service Commission).
V. Recommendations of the National Judicial Pay Commission
11. This matter has been examined by the first National Judicial
Pay Commission headed by Justice K.
Jagannatha Shetty, former Judge of the Supreme Court (and comprising two
retired Judges of the High Court).
Their report was submitted in the year 1999. In the summary of recommendations published by the said
Commission, it supported and reiterated the recommendations of the Law
Commission contained in its Fourteenth Report (referred to herein above) for
the creation of an All-India Judicial Service. It fully supported the
reasoning given by the Law Commission in support of the said
recommendation. It then referred to the
observation of the Supreme Court in the All India Judges case (AIR 1992 S.C.
165) to the effect that “the feasibility of the implementation of the
recommendations of the Law Commission may be examined expeditiously and
implemented as early as possible. It is
in the interest of the health of the judiciary throughout the country that this
should be done. The report of the Pay
Commission then refers to the fact that the Government of India had elicited
the opinions of the State Governments and High Courts in this behalf and that
whereas eight State Governments agreed with the proposal and another eight
State Governments gave conditional approval to the proposal, seven State
Governments have opposed the same. So
far as the High Courts are concerned, it is stated that four High Courts have
favoured the idea, four have given their conditional approval while three have
opposed and five High Courts did not
offer any opinion in the light of the judgment Supreme Court. The Pay
Commission had also invited the views and comments on the methodology of
constituting an All India Judicial Service after considering which it made the following recommendations:-
(i) The AIJS should be
constituted only in the cadre of District Judges as per provisions of Article
312 (3) of the Constitution. The
District Judges directly recruited and promoted should constitute the AIJS.
(ii) The selection for
direct recruitment should be by the National Judicial Commission / UPSC and the
promotees by the respective High Courts.
(iii) The qualification for
direct recruitment to AIJS should be in conformity with that prescribed under
Article 233(2) of the Constitution.
(iv) Service Judges also
should be allowed to compete for recruitment of AIJS, by appropriately amending
Article 233(2) of the Constitution.
(v) Not exceeding 25% of
the posts in the cadre of District Judges in every State should be earmarked
for direct recruitment.
(vi) The age limit for
recruitment to AIJS should be between 35 years to 45 years.
(vii) The procedure for
selection shall be by written examination followed by viva voce.
(viii) Appointment : The
National Judicial Commission / UPSC, after selecting the candidates for direct
recruitment to the cadre of District Judges, must allocate to the States / UTs,
the candidates equal to the vacancies that are surrendered by them. The High Court thereupon will recommend
those names to the Governor for appointment as per Article 233 of the
Constitution.
(ix) Training : The
prescribed training is only after the appointment.
(x) Seniority : All India
seniority is as per the ranking in the select list.
(xi) Inter-se Seniority in
the State/UT : The inter-se seniority between direct recruits and
promotees shall be determined according
to the date of allotment and date of
promotion. Such direct recruits must
thus be annexed to the respective State Judicial Service within the three-tier
system.
(xii) Court Language:
Recording of the deposition should be: (1) Regional Language (to be recorded by
the Court Officer); and (2) English (by the Presiding Officer).
VI. Some relevant considerations
12. The National Commission to Review the Working of the
Constitution is of the opinion that while examining the idea of All-India Judicial Service the following
factors may also have to be kept in view:-
(a)
Whether the creation of AIJS would lead to further erosion
of the powers of the States whose powers under the present dispensation are not many. By virtue of several entries in the Union List (which provide for
the Union taking over certain subjects within the State List in case the
Parliament declares it to be expedient in public interest) and as a result of
the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, the powers of the States
have already been adversely affected.
Is it advisable to diminish them further by taking away the power of
selection from the High Courts and by vesting it in a Central body?
(b)
The provisions of Article 312 of the Constitution as amended
by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act have really created a
problem. According to clause (3) of the
said Article, such service shall not include any post inferior to that of a
“district judge” as defined in Article 236.
Now if the idea is to induct bright and young persons to the service
from the age group 24 to 30, such persons have to be posted soon after
selection and training as district judges. District judges not only try serious
criminal cases like murder and dacoity but also exercise appellate jurisdiction
in both criminal and civil matters.
They also exercise original jurisdiction in certain civil matters. Would it be advisable to entrust the direct
recruits of the said age group with such vast powers and would they be able to
take upon such task? However if the idea is (as recommended by the first
National Judicial Pay Commission) that the direct recruits are to be drawn from
the age group 35 to 45 would there be any improvement over the present position?
This is because age group 35 to 45 means that they are all practicing
lawyers. If a practicing lawyer does
not make good in his profession by the time he reaches the said age group, it
means that he is no good. In other
words, a practicing lawyer who has made good by the said age in the profession
would not like to join the AIJS and face the prospect of being posted to some
other State and subject to transfer from time to time. Indeed that is the present difficulty faced by the High Court as well. A lawyer who is reasonably intelligent and
competent is bound to establish himself in profession by the time he reaches
the age 35-40. Such a lawyer is not
generally inclined to leave his practice and join the service as district judge
where he is likely to be transferred from time to time even though within the
State. That is the reason why many
competent people are not coming forward to join the service, and if the service
is made an All-India service, with the attending possibility of being allocated
to any other State in India, and then again transfers within that State, would
they not be all the more reluctant to
join such a service?
(c)
There is yet another circumstance. If you select persons between the age group 24 to 30 or 24 to 32
and post them as district judges, they would be ripe for being considered for
appointment to the High Court within about 10 to 15 years. (It may be remembered that in every High
Court a particular quota is reserved to be filled from among the members of the
subordinate judiciary. (The quota so
reserved varies today from 40% to 50%.)
This means that a member of AIJS would be ripe for being considered for
appointment to the High Court even before he may have reached the age of 40.
Desirability of such possibility should also have to be kept in mind,
particularly in view of the fact that the nature of the work at the level of
the High Court is of a varied character involving fields not dealt with by
District Judges in the subordinate courts.
(d)
Would it be advisable to amend Article 312 again by removing
clause (3)? In such a case, it will be
possible to recruit young and bright persons between the age group 24-30 to
AIJS and to post them as Munsiff/magistrate to start with and then they would
go up the ladder in course of time.
But this course would mean that even the selection and appointment of
music/magistrates would also be removed from the purview of the State and would
stand transferred to a Central body.
The desirability of this course is also a matter to be kept in mind. It may also have to be considered whether
such a course would really mean any improvement over the existing situation or
would it be merely a re-incarnation of the existing system with a slight
modification i.e., selection and appointment (and allocation) by a central body
rather than by the High Court/Public Service Commission/Sate Government?
QUESTIONNAIRE
ON
ALL INDIA JUDICAL SERVICE
2. If you
answer to Question No. 1 is in the affirmative, what should be the eligibility
criteria for the candidates? How do you meet the handicap of not knowing the
local language in which the subordinate courts transact most of their work?
3. Do you
agree that amendment of Article 312 effected by the Constitution (42nd
Amendment) Act, 1976 has created difficulties in the way of constitution of an
All India Judicial Service? If yes, do
you agree with the proposal to delete clause (3) of Article 312 as suggested at
page 18 of the Consultation Paper?
4. What are
your views on the idea and queries posed in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) at pages
14 to 17 of the Consultation Paper ?
5. Have you
any other suggestions to make on the issues discussed in the Consultation
Paper? If so, please state them.